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A Container Should Never Be a Package:
Going Beyond Mitsui v. American Export
Lines, Inc.
I. Introduction
Section 1304(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of
19361 limits a carrier's and ship's liability "for any loss or dam-
age to or in connection with the transportation of goods"2 to
$500 per package.8 COGSA was enacted when packages were
generally small; the $500 limitation provision did not foresee
containerization, a cost efficient means of transporting goods by
sea in large metal boxes usually eight feet by eight feet by
twenty or forty feet.' Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc.,5 a
recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, concerns the
application of the $500 package limitation to the shipments of
goods in containers. Mitsui held that when the bill of lading
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as COGSA].
2. Id. § 1304(5).
3. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss
or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount ex-
ceeding $500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods
not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit,. . . unless the nature and
value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and in-
serted in the bill of lading.
Id.
4. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 814 (2d Cir. 1971). See
generally BRANCH, ELEMENTS OF SHiPInG 210-14 (1975). The benefits of containerization
include door to door service, a decrease in damage and pilferage, less time in port for
loading and unloading, a decrease in labor costs, and more favorable insurance premi-
ums. This method of transportation started to become a major aspect of the marine
industry in the mid-1960'ald.
5. 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981). The Mitsui decision is a consolidation of two deci-
sions: Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., which dealt with tin ingots, and Armstrong
v. American Export Lines, Inc., which dealt with rolls of carpet. These two cases will be
hereinafter referred to as Mitsui.
6. A bill of lading is the "contract between the shipper and the carrier. It defines the
rights, duties, exemptions, and limitations of the parties, whether imposed by statute or
the result of voluntary agreement." Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (footnote omitted).
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discloses the contents of the container and the container is fur-
nished or owned by the carrier, such container is not a package
as used in section 1304(5).7
This note discusses the criteria used by the different circuits
and by the Mitsui court in defining "package" as that term is
used in COGSA section 1304(5). It describes and analyzes the
reasoning of the Mitsui court and then criticizes the court for
limiting its holding when it had the opportunity to announce a
new standard which would promote uniformity and predictabil-
ity. The note concludes that the purposes8 of COGSA section
1304(5) would be more satisfactorily achieved if the courts
would recognize that a container should never be a package for
purposes of carrier liability under COGSA section 1304(5). Fur-
ther, it is recommended that Congress adopt a container limita-
tion which would serve the purposes of COGSA when goods are
shipped in containers.
H. Background
The principal purpose of the COGSA package limitation
was to set "a reasonable figure below which the carrier should
not be permitted to limit his liability.' Another important pur-
pose was to establish international uniformity, 0 thus promoting
fairness in matters relating to ocean bills of lading for all those
engaged in marine transportation." By describing a unit of as-
certainable size in line with a "common sense standard," the
Second Circuit has noted that the package limitation promotes
7. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 821. See Edelman, Cargo
Claims Involving Containers, N.Y.L.J., March 6, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
8. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
9. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d at 815.
10. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960, 962 (9th
Cir. 1974); International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 157 (1931-32).
11. See H.R. Rm. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Seas. 7 (1936) (quoted in Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1969)). The
House Report stated:
[T]he uniformity and simplification of bills of lading will be of immense value to
shippers who will be relieved of the necessity of closely examining all bills of lad-
ing to determine the exceptions contained therein to ascertain their rights and
responsibilities; to underwriters who insure the cargo and are met with the same
difficulties; and to bankers who extend credit upon the bills of lading.
[Vol. 2:309
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uniformity of bills of lading, thereby reducing litigation.2
Section 1304(5) was enacted principally to protect shippers
from carriers who were otherwise able to limit their liability to
insubstantial amounts by injecting clauses into bills of lading
which the shippers could not refuse.'3 Carriers, originally liable
for virtually all cargo losses," began to compel shippers to agree
to contracts which set the carrier's liability at nominal
amounts.' 5 These contracts were regarded by Congress as adhe-
sion contracts because the shippers were in a weak bargaining
position. 6
The courts have recognized the primary reason for the en-
actment of the package limitation and its purposes, but they
12. Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Ge-
sellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 491 F.2d at 962
(citing Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1935: Hearings on S. 1152 Before the Comm. on Com-
merce, 74th Cong., 1st. Seas. 15, 47 (1935)). COGSA was designed to establish more equi-
table carrier liability without a corresponding increase in freight rates. Id. See also Si-
mon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 507, 517-19, 535-36 (1974).
Congress' concern for the shipper is also reflected in COGSA § 1303(8) which
provides:
[A]ny clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier
or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods,
arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in
this section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter,
shall be null and void and of no effect ....
46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1976).
14. Prior to 1936, carriers were held absolutely liable for all cargo losses save those
arising from an Act of God or the Public Enemy. Simon, The Law of Shipping Contain-
ers, 5 J. MA. L. & CoM. 507, 517-18 (1974). COGSA changed carriers' absolute liability,
46 U.S.C. § 1304(1) (1976) provides that-
[N]either the carrier nor the. ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part
of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly
manned, equipped, and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool
chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe
Id. Carrier liability exemptions are found in 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2). The exemptions extend
well beyond losses arising from an Act of God or the Public Enemy, including "act, neg-
lect or default of the master... or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the
management of the ship." Id. at § 1304(2)(a). See Simon, Latest Developments in the
Law of Shipping Containers, 4 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 441, 441-42 (1972).
15. See Simon, Latest Developments in the Law of Shipping Containers, 4 J. MA.
L. & CoM. 441, 441-42 (1972).
16. See id.
3
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have varied its application. 17 The inconsistent application is due,
in part, to insufficient guidance from Congress in the form of a
definition of "package," and to changes in the size of the pack-
age unit through containerization. When confronted with the is-
sue of whether a container is a package within section 1304(5),
the courts have principally relied on the following factors:18 the
ownership of the container;19 the information on the bill of lad-
ing;20 and the nature of the contained goods. 21
17. See infra notes 18-21.
18. Additionally, courts have considered other factors. E.g., Shinko Boeki Co. v. S.S.
Pioneer Moon, 507 F.2d 342, 345 (2d Cir. 1974) (2,000 gallon tanks containing liquid
latex are not packages since they are more analogous to a functional part of the ship
than to 55 gallon drums previously used by shippers in transporting liquids); Mitsubishi
Int'l Corp. v. S. S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 922 (1963) (fully boxed roll of steel is a package notwithstanding size and weight of
32 tons); Gulf Italia Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 263 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959) (partially enclosed tractor is not a package); Rosenbruch v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 982, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd,
543 F.2d 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939 (1976) (container holding household
goods of a single shipper held to be a package because the shipper packed the container
and because uniformity of result and simplicity of approach would be achieved);
Lucchese v. Malabe Shipping Co., 351 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D. Puerto Rico 1972) (trailer
with flat rate charged rather than the customary rate based on tonnage of cargo is a
package).
19. See, e.g., Rosenbruch v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. 357 F. Supp.
at 985. Plaintiff's household goods were placed by the shipper in a container which was
owned by the shipping company. The shipper indicated on the bill of lading the number
"1" under the column "Number of Containers or Other Packages." The cargo was worth
$102,917.08 but the court determined that the container was a package and limited the
carrier's liability to $500. The court stated that ownership, along with the general intent
of the parties, must be considered. Id. at 984-85. But see Simon, Latest Developments In
The Law of Shipping Containers, 4 J. MAP- L. & Com. 441, 447 (1972). The ownership of
the container is immaterial; a reliance on this factor is an "invitation to inquire into
evasive and irrelevant matters." Id.
20. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
Leather worth $155,192 was loaded into 99 cartons. Each carton was wrapped with steel
(thereby qualifying them as bales) and then placed into one container supplied by the
carrier. The bill of lading indicated "1 container said to contain 99 bales of leather." Id.
at 804. Due to the disclosure on the bill of lading and the carrier's ownership of the
container, the court determined that each bale was a package. Id. at 814-16. See also
Lucchese v. Malabe Shipping Co., 351 F. Supp. at 590, 592-93. Cf. U.S.C. § 1303(8)
(1976), which states that "[amny clause.. . in a [bill of lading] relieving the carrier...
from liability for loss or damage to.. .goods... shall be null and void and of no effect.
Id. But cf. Shinko Boeki Co. v. S. S. Pioneer Moon, 507 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1974). That
court determined that tanks carrying liquid latex were not packages despite the wording
on the bill of lading. Id. at 345.
21. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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The Second Circuit focused on this last factor to formulate
the functional economics test of Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V
Kulmerland.22 The court held that so long as the contents of the
container were packaged inside the container in the manner that
would have been necessary had they been transported in the
holds of the ship, they were deemed "functional package units"
or "funcional economic units.' 2 3 The court found the units
within the container not to be functional;2 the carrier's liability
was thus limited to $500.25 The Kulmerland court, for all practi-
cal purposes, exonerated the carrier from liability, creating the
inequitable result Congress sought to prevent in enacting
COGSA.26
The functional economics test has been criticized27 and has
not been followed by the courts.28 The Second Circuit, in Shinko
22. 483 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1973).
23. Id. at 648-49. In Kulmerland the shipper was sending 350 cartons of adding
machines valued at $29,000 packaged in one container. Id. at 646. The adding machines
were individually packaged in "little cardboard cartons, stapled and paper-taped." Id. at
649. This type of packaging was not used in breakbulk shipments before containeriza-
tion; rather, adding machines were traditionally packed in wooden cases or crates. Id.
24. Id. at 649.
25. Id. See De Orchis, The Container and the Package Limitation -The Search for
Predictability, 5 J. MA& L. & COM. 251, 257 (1974) (the functional economics test re-
quires the shipper to forego the economies of containerized packaging by compelling him
to package his units as if they were unprotected by the container). See also Simon, The
Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 507, 523 (1974) ("in the name of
economic functionalism, the [Kulmerland] decision fosters economic waste").
The Kulmerland court set forth the following evidentiary rules: If the units were
functional, a presumption that the units were the packages was established and the bur-
den was on the carrier to show otherwise; similarly, if the units were not functional, the
burden was placed on the shipper to show that the units were the packages. This burden
could be satisfied by showing the intent of the parties and by establishing that the units
were customarily shipped breakbulk. Royal Typewriter Co. v. MIV Kulmerland, 483 F.2d
at 649.
26. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MA& L. & CoM., 507,
520-32 (1974). Cartons have traditionally worked as packages; if they are not to be con-
sidered packages, what is their classification? "The use of the term 'functional'... is
unrealistic .... [a] thing is functional if it works." Id. at 522; De Orchis, The Container
and the Package Limitations - The Search for Predictability, 5 J. MA. L. & CoM. 251,
257 (1974). Both shipper and carrier have reason to complain about the functional eco-
nomics test. The test "affords no predictability for the carrier ... and leaves it in the
dark when it comes to buying insurance." Id. Avoiding the limitation applied in Kulmer-
land requires the shipper to expensively package his goods, thus creating economic
waste. Id.
28. E.g., In re Tug Dorothy H., 478 F. Supp. 383, 392 (E.D. Va. 1979). Regarding the
5
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Boeki Co. v. S. S. Pioneer Moon 2 9 refused to follow Kulmerland
and looked instead to the holding of Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S.
Mormaclynx.s Leather's Best defined the metal container as
"functionally a part of the ship." 1 The Shinko court held that
containerized tanks of liquid cargo were not packages and were
more closely analogous to the tanks in the holds of the ship than
to the 55 gallon drums previously used for the shipment of liq-
uid cargo breakbulk. 2
Although Kulmerland was decided after Leather's Best, it
did not overrule it.8 The two cases were premised on entirely
different principles. The Kulmerland court focused on the func-
tional nature of the units within the containers;" the Leather's
functional economics test as "too narrow," the court established a list of 12 criteria to
determine whether the container was the package. Id.; Matsushita Elec. Corp. v. S. S.
Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp. 894, 904 (W.D. Wash. 1976). The court found the functional
economics test unsatisfactory and violative of the judicial rule that courts should en-
courage good commercial practices and refrain from "creating disincentives to mercantile
economization." Id. (footnote omitted); Accord Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East
Line, Inc., 491 F.2d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 1974). The court held that a large electrical trans-
former, intended for outside utse, attached to a wooden skid, was not the package. The
court took special note of the fact that since the legislators did not attach a technical
meaning to the word "package", it would be construed according to the ordinary man
standard. Id.
29. 507 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). Shinko Boeki Co. v. S. S. Pioneer Moon, 507 F.2d at
345.
31. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d at 815.
32. Shinko Boeki Co. v. S. S. Pioneer Moon, 507 F.2d at 345. Shinko distinguished
Kulmerland on the grounds that the bill of lading in Kulmerland did not disclose as
much information as the bill of lading in Shinko and that the functional economics test
was not helpful in shipments of liquids. Id. But see Simon, More on the Law of Shipping
Containers, 6 J. MA. L. & COM. 603, 608 (1975). The Second Circuit in Shinko refused
to follow Kulmerland as evidenced by the fact that the shipper had previously shipped
the liquid in 55 gallon drums. Id.
33. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d at 649. The Kulmer-
land court distinguished Leather's Best on the ground that the bales of leather could
have been shipped without a container and were thus functional. Id.
34. Id. at 647-48. The Kulmerland court rejected the importance of the Leather's
Best requirement of disclosure of the units within the carrier-owned or carrier-supplied
containers. The court reasoned that ownership of the containers is not important be-
cause: (a) The container is used for the benefit of both the shipper and the carrier and it
is not an integral part of the shipment; and, (b) containers do not become the property
of the consignees but are reused by the owner for as many different shipments as possi-
ble. The court further reasoned that disclosure is irrelevant because it cannot be verified.
Id. at 647.
Kulmerland attributed the Leather's Best outcome to the difficult question that the
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/6
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Best court focused on the ownership of the containers, as well as
the intent of the shipper and the carrier as exemplified by the
information on the bill of lading.35 Further, the Leather's Best
court, after recognizing conflicting arguments," adhered to the
primary purpose of COGSA,3 7 and held that under the circum-
stances of the case, the determination of the package was "more
sensibly related to the unit in which the shipper packed the
goods and described them than to a large metal object, function-
ally a part of the ship, in which the carrier caused them to be
'contained.' "38 Notwithstanding this declaration, Leather's Best
left open whether a container would be a package for purposes
of COGSA when the bill of lading does not state the number of
cartons or when the container was owned or furnished by the
shipper."9
The foregoing line of cases demonstrates the need for a defi-
nition of package, particularly as it applies to a shipping
container. Some standard must be developed so that the burden
of risk, at the time of contract, is placed on either the shipper or
the carrier4 0 and so that the purposes of COGSA are upheld.
court was faced with in light of Standard Electrica and the current developments of
containerization and palletization in ocean transportation. Standard Electrica had held
that nine pallets containing cardboard cartons of television timers were packages be-
cause: (1) The bill of lading only indicated "9 pallets" under the heading "packages;" (2)
each pallet had the physical characteristics of a package; and, (3) the shipper chose the
pallet because of its convenience. Standard Electrica," S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamer-
ikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d at 946. The Kulmerland court's func-
tional economics test was designed to provide certainty in the law so that litigation
would be avoided, a goal Leather's Best apparently did not achieve. See Royal Type-
writer Co. v. MV Kulmerland, 483 F.2d at 649.
35. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d at 814-16.
36. Id. at 815. The court recognized that there was merit to the contention that if
the containers were treated as packages, it would promote uniformity and predictability;
the court also noted that the argument about the weak bargaining position of the shipper
may not be applicable where the shipper fully packs the shipments of containers. Id.
37. Id. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
38. Id. at 815. (footnote omitted).
39. Id. Contra Simon, Latest Developments in the Law of Shipping Containers, 4
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 441 (1973) (container is not a package was clear holding of Leather's
Best).
40. See De Orchis, The Container and the Package Limitation -The Search for
Predictability, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 251 (1974). In balancing the need for predictability
with increased transportation costs, the shipper should be given the option of declaring
the container as the package, or declaring the value and freight. Id. at 279. DeOrchis
favors placing the burden on the shipper because the cargo insurance the shipper
7
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III. Facts
The defendant in Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 1
owned and operated the containership Red Jacket."4 Containers
of tin ingots and rolls of carpet were loaded onboard the Red
Jacket and, thereafter, lost during a storm at sea.43 The defen-
dant was held liable for the losses in an earlier decision.44 All
damage claims were settled with the exception of (a) the claim
of the consignees of the 1,834 tin ingots placed in five contain-
ers;4" and (b) the claim of the shippers of the 1,705 rolls of car-
pet placed in 13 containers."a These remaining claims were con-
solidated by the district court and the Second Circuit. 7
The containers which held the ingots and carpet were
owned by the defendant and given to the shippers for packing."8
They were returned to the defendant packed and sealed by the
shippers at the shippers' premises.'9 It was the intention of the
shippers and the defendant to forward the containers unopened
to the consignees. 50 Because the defendant did not verify the
contents of the sealed containers, he stamped the bill of lading
for the carpet "Shipper's Load & Count." 51 The bills of lading
purchases is cheaper than the Privilege and Indemnity Insurance the carriers purchase.
Id. at 277. See also Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MA. L. &
Cohi. 603, 616 (1975). Insurance should not be considered in the legal definition of the
word "package;" such considerations are outside the scope of legal issues. Id. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
41. 636 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 810.
43. Id.
44. Id. In Houlden & Co. v. S.S. Red Jacket, 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1128, rehearing denied, 440 U.S. 968 (1979), American Export Lines
was held liable for the loss of 43 containers and the damage of seven containers.
45. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 810-11. The containers used
for both the ingots and the rolls of carpet were 8 feet high, 8 feet wide and 20 feet or 40
feet long. Id. at 811.
46. Id. at 810.
47. See supra note 5.
48. Mitsui v. American Export Lines Inc., 636 F.2d at 811.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 812. A carrier affixes such a stamp to the bill of lading to indicate that he
is not accepting, as his own, the shipper's numbers, and to show that the contents of the
containers were not verified. The phrase "said to contain" also shows the carrier's quali-
fication of the numbers on the bill of lading. Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Con-
tainers, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 603, 609-10 (1975). There was no indication in Mitsui that
the bill of lading for the ingots bore the "shippers load and count" stamp.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/6
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pertaining to both types of cargo indicated the number of con-
tainers along with the number of units said to be contained
within each container.5 2
In both cases, the district court applied the package limita-
tion to the units of cargo, i.e., each bundle of ingots55 and each
roll of carpet," rather than to the containers. 5 The district
court, therefore, awarded to the consignees of the ingots,
$62,000.58 The decision was based upon the usefulness of the
bundles in the loading and unloading process.5 7 Plaintiff con-
signees appealed contending that the ingots were not shipped in
packages58 and that it should be awarded the value of the
cargo.5 9 Defendant carrier cross-appealed contending that the
containers were packages and that its liability should be limited
to $2,500 (five containers multiplied by $500 package limita-
tion).,0 With regard to the carpet, the district court found that
each roll of carpet was a package and awarded the shippers the
value of the carpet.61 Defendant again appealed contending that
the containers were the packages and that its liability should be
52. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 812.
53. Each ingot was 4 inches wide 5 inches in depth and 18 inches long with an aver-
age weight of 78 pounds. The ingots were stacked in 124 bundles of 15. The shipper
inserted on the bill of lading the number of bundles of ingots within each container. Id.
at 811-12.
54. The rolls of floor covering were on the average six feet long, each roll covered
approximately 60 square yards of material and weighed from 250 to 350 pounds. Each
roll was bound in Kraft paper with a disc at each extreme; a hollow cardboard roll was
used to wrap the carpet around. Id. at 812.
55. Id. at 813.
56. Id. The $62,000 award was determined by multiplying the 124 bundles (found by
the court to be the packages) by the $500 package limitation.
57. Id. at 813. See infra note 58. For different reasons the court of appeals affirmed
the consignees' awards.
58. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 813. A clause in the bill of
lading fixed defendant's liability at "$500 per package or per shipping unit." Id. at 812.
The consignees argued that the bundles of ingots were not packages and, according to
the clause in the bill of lading, the $500 limitation should be applied to each shipping
unit, i.e., each ingot. Id. at 813.
59. Id. 1,834 ingots multiplied by $500 would exceed the value of the cargo. 46
U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976) states: "In no event shall the carrier be liable for more than the
amount of damage actually sustained. Id.
60. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 813. The defendant sought to
limit its liability for the ingots to $2,500 when their value was $369,404.40.
61. Id. Although each roll of carpet was found to be a package, 1,705 rolls multiplied
by $500 would exceed the value of the goods. See supra note 59.
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limited to $6,500 (13 containers multiplied by $500 package
limitation). 2
IV. The Court of Appeals' Decision
The court of appeals' inquiry began with an examination of
the language of section 1304(5) and a search for the meaning of
the word package.6 3 The court then referred to the Senate Com-
mittee hearings in an effort to discern the purpose of the stat-
ute." The court acknowledged that the purposes of the COGSA
package limitation were twofold: First, to limit the carrier's lia-
bility to $500 per package; and, second, to nullify any agreement
to the contrary.65 The Second Circuit then emphasized that the
carrier's duties under COGSA66 would be meaningless if there
were no significant liability imposed.67 The requirement of due
diligence" to make a ship seaworthy would become an empty
standard; a carrier's duty to care for his cargo and take necesary
precautions would not be coupled with any commercial
inducement.69
The Second Circuit then stated that the Kulmerland deci-
62. Id. The defendant sought to limit its liability to $6,500 when the value of the
carpet was $357,946.19.
63. Id. at 813-14. See also Nichimen Co. v. M.V. Farland, 462 F.2d 319, 334 (2d Cir.
1972) (dictionary definitions may be considered in defining package).
64. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc,. 636 F.2d at 814-15. See supra notes 9-12
and accompanying text.
65. Id. The court found support for the primary purposes of the Act in Gilmore &
Black's interpretation of § 1304(5): "COGSA allows a freedom of contracting out of its
terms, but only in the direction of increasing the shipowner's liabilities ... ." Id. n. 6
(quoting GLMoRE & BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADmALTY § 3-25 at 145 (2d ed. 1975) (empha-
sis in original)).
66. Id. at 815. 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976) reads in pertinent part:
(1) The carrier shall be bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exer-
cise due diligence to -
(a) Make the ship seaworthy...
(2) The carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care
for, and discharge the goods carried.
Id.
67. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 815.
68. See N. HFALY & D. SHAm, CASES AND MATEIALS ON ADMIRALTY 484 (1974).
Examples of lack of due diligence to make a vessel seaworthy include: overloading a
vessel, leaving the hatches unsecured, negligent stowage, and failure to make tanks tight.
Id.
69. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 815.
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sion was inconsistent with the decision of Leather's Best.70 First,
the court noted that Leather's Best was not based on the bales
of leather being "functional" but on the disclosure of the con-
tents of the container on the bill of lading and the fact that the
container was owned or furnished by the carrier.7 1 Second, under
the functional economics test, the contents of a carrier-supplied
container might not be considered packages because they were
not functional, notwithstanding an adherence to the Leather's
Best requirement of disclosure.7 2 In other words, a shipper could
comply with the disclosure requirement of Leather's Best, yet
find that the carrier's liability would be limited to $500 per
container because the units within the container were not func-
tional. Due to this inconsistency, and because Mitsui and
Leather's Best both dealt with disclosure of carrier-owned con-
tainers, 8 the Second Circuit declined to follow Kulmerland.7
The court further criticized Kulmerland because it overlooked
the possibility that the goods not in packages could be shipped
as customary freight units within section 1304(5),75 and because
Kulmerland was at odds with the purposes of COGSA.7 a
The Second Circuit reached its decision by applying the
Leather's Best analysis7" to the facts in Mitsui.7 8 It held that
each roll of carpet was a package7' because the shipper wrapped
70. Id. at 818.
71. Id.
72. Id. at n.U.
73. See supra note 20 and text accompanying note 52. One important difference,
however, between the two cases is that in Leather's Best, the carrier agent was present
when the container was packed so that the carrier could verify the information on the
bill of lading, while in Mitsui, the carrier's agent was not present when the containers
were being packed. See infra notes 99-100 and text accompanying note 84.
74. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 818.
75. Id. at 818-19. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976) reads in pertinent part:
Neither the carriers nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any
loss or damage . . . exceeding $500 per package ... or in case of goods not
shipped in packages, per customary freight units ....
Id.
76. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 818. Kulmerland was at odds
with both the language of § 1304(5) and the underlying purposes of COGSA. Id.
77. See supra note 20 and text accompanying notes 35-39.
78. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 821-23.
79. Id. at 821. The rolls of carpet would not have been packages had the shipper not
wrapped them in preparation for transport. Id. If the rolls were not wrapped and thus
not packages, the carrier's liability would have been determined by the customary freight
1982]
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each roll and disclosed the number of rolls in the containers to
the carrier.80 The court further held that each bundle of ingots
was a package and sustained the district court's award.81
V. Analysis
The Second Circuit's criticism of Kulmerland was adequate
for the immediate decision but lacked the force necessary to deal
more comprehensively with the problem of the container as a
package. By expounding on the purposes of COGSA as a whole
and on section 1304(5) in particular, the court established the
groundwork for a far reaching decision. The court proceeded
with caution, however, and made it clear that "[n]othing said
here, of course, covers the situation in which the bill of lading
does not show how many separate packages or units there are. 8 2
The Leather's Best court propounded a nearly identical qualifi-
cation" which led the Second Circuit to reevaluate the container
problem in a subsequent decision; the result was the Kulmer-
unit. The Mitsui court recognized that even if the rolls of carpet were not considered
packages, that would not necessarily mean that the containers were packages. The $500
limit would apply per customary freight unit. See id. at 822. In its analysis, Mitsui criti-
cized Kulmerland for failing to take the freight unit into consideration. Id. at 818-19.
80. Id. at 821.
81. Id. at 821-23. The court of appeals, however, rejected the reasoning of the dis-
trict court. The district court had held that each bundle of ingots was a package because
of its usefulness in the loading and unloading process. Id. at 813. See supra text accom-
panying notes 53-59. The court of appeals held: (a) The ingots themselves were not pack-
ages; the shipper did not bind the ingots together in any manner, and the stacking of the
ingots in bundles did not make them packages; (b) the court would have applied the
$500 limitation to the customary freight unit but for a clause in the bill of lading which
set the level of liability at "$500 per shipping unit." In the bill of lading, shipping unit
meant each physical unit (ingot); (c) Since the shipper represented on the bill of lading
that the contents of the containers were 124 bundles of ingots and the carrier had no way
of verifying the statements, the consignees, as the shipper's agents, were estopped from
asserting that the bundles were not package; (d) The $500 limitation applied to each
bundle; (e) The consignees were awarded $62,000 (the number of bundles multiplied by
the $500 limitation). Id. at 822-23.
82. Id. at 821 n. 18.
83. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d at 815. In trying to distinguish
Standard Electrica S. A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft,
375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967), the court recognized that the
differences between the two cases were not altogether satisfactory. The court, therefore,
stated that it was not deciding a case where the cargo was packed in a container already
on the shipper's premises and where the bill of lading did not disclose the number of
units within the container. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d at 815.
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land decision.8 4 Thus the container problem came full circle in
Mitsui. The application of the package limitation to the
container is now as ambiguous as it was after Leather's Best.
Mitsui looked beyond Kulmerland to Leather's Best as the ap-
propriate standard for determining the COGSA "package" and
reaffirmed the Leather's Best holding that the intent of the par-
ties was critical to the outcome of the decision. 5 According to
Leather's Best, intent could be determined by the information
on the bill of lading 6 and the ownership of the container. 7
There, the intent of the parties was clear because the carrier
owned the container, and the bill of lading indicated the number
of bales of leather which was verified by the carrier's agent."
Because the parties clearly intended that the bales of leather
were the packages, the Leather's Best court upheld the primary
purpose of COGSA, which sets "a reasonable figure below which
the carrier should not be permitted to limit his liability . ... 8
The Mitsui court adopted the criteria used in Leather's
Best; however, the intent of the carrier and the shippers was not
as clear as it was in Leather's Best because the information on
the bill of lading was not verified. The reliability of the informa-
tion on the bill of lading in determining the intent of the parties
was, therefore, questionable. The court apparently did not con-
sider section 1303(3)90 of COGSA when it held that the shippers'
84. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
85. Mitsui v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d at 821.
86. Leather's Best, Inc., v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d at 814-16. In Smyth-
greyhound v. M/V Eurygenes, 666 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit com-
mented that intent is not always very clear and that Mitsui and Leather's Best rejected
a complex intent analysis in favor of a "clear rule that where the contents of the
container are disclosed in the bill of lading then the container is not the COGSA pack-
age." Id. at 753.
87. But cf. Simon, Latest Developments in the Law of Shipping Containers, 4 J.
MA. L. & CoM. 441, 447 (1973). Many times the container is rented and ownership is
not discernible. If ownership is a determinative factor of whether the container is a pack-
age, than many times neither the shipper nor the carrier would be able to ascertain at
the time of contract who bears the risk of loss. Id. See supra note 34.
88. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d at 804.
89. Id. at 815 (footnote omitted).
90. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(3) (1976) states in pertinent part-
After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier... shall, on demand of the
shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading showing among other things...
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity or weight, as the
case may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper.
1982]
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disclosure of the contents was an indication of the parties' in-
tent. Section 1303(3) states that a carrier should not be bound
by quantity or value representations on the bill of lading when
the statements cannot be verified.9 1 When disclosure is made by
the shipper, many times the carrier will indicate an intent not to
be bound by his nonverifiable figures by stamping on the bill of
lading "shippers load & count. '9 2 Reliance by the courts on the
bills of lading has been criticized: The courts should uphold the
purposes of COGSA by looking to the intent of the legislators
rather than relying on a bill of lading intent analysis.9 3 Since the
carrier is the "final arbiter" of the contents of the bill of lading,
reliance on this factor in determining whether a container is a
package would, very often, result in nominal carrier liability. Al-
though a carrier might argue that he should not be liable for
that which he has not observed,9' an absolute avoidance of his
liability based on this argument contravenes the purposes of
COGSA.9e
(c) ... Provided, That no carrier, master, or agent of the carrier, shall be
bound to state or show in the bill of lading any marks, number, quantity, or
weight which he has reasonable ground for suspecting not accurately to represent
the goods actually received, or which he has had no reasonable means of checking.
Id. (emphasis in original).
91. Id. § 1303(3)(c).
92. See Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J. MAn. L. & CoM. 603,
615-16 (1975). See supra note 51.
93. Id. "In applying See. 4(5)... it is the intention of the legislators that must be
carrierd out - not the fictional 'intention of the parties' to a [bill of lading] ... "Id. at
616.
94. See, e.g., Note, The Shipping Container as a COGSA Package -The Debate
Continues, 5 MAR. LAW. 88, 91 (1980).
95. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. The primary reason shippers do
not place the number of units within the container on the bill of lading is because the
carrier will not give a bill of lading with numbers he cannot verify. Upon receipt of one
container, the carrier, who can verify only that particular item, will issue a bill of lading
with an indication of the number of containers. Shippers accept this and refrain from
putting numbers on the bill of lading. Furthermore, when there is a loss, shippers have
the burden of proving the contents of the containers including the exact number of units
within the containers. In refusing to give a bill of lading for anything more than the
number of containers, the carriers do not anticipate their possible liability. They predi-
cate the decision on the fact that the container is the only verifiable item. The carrier
will want to know, however, the nature of the goods because the freight rate is based on
the nature and weight of the goods. Other reasons shippers do not place the number of
units on the bill of lading are carelessness and lack of familiarity with the case law.
Telephone Interview with Seymour Simon, Member New York Bar; formerly an adviser
to the Department of State on Maritime Law in connection with the Brussels Conven-
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Since the container has been defined by Leather's Best, as
well as by the United States Supreme Court,9" as a part of the
ship, the following question inevitably arises: How can the
container change from a part of the ship into a package when
the shipper fails to disclose the contents or when the container
is owned or supplied by the shipper rather than the carrier? The
container is either a part of the ship or it is a package for pur-
poses of section 1304(5). Insofar as the Mitsui court has classi-
fied the container as a part of the ship and not a package only
when there is disclosure of the contents of carrier-owned or fur-
nished containers, it is to be criticized.'7 Arguably, carriers have
legitimate interests in knowing the nature and quantity of goods
within a container; as final arbiters, however, they have the op-
portunity to ascertain this information. An omission of such in-
formation by a shippper should not make the container a pack-
age for purposes of carrier liability.,$ Furthermore, section
1304(5) clearly states that disclosure of the nature and value of
the goods is necessary only when the value of the shipper's goods
individually exceeds the $500 limitation."9 Therefore, Congress
considered this disclosure in drafting section 1304(5); if it had
intended that the nature and value of the goods should be dis-
positive of the package definition, it would have so indicated.
Insofar as the Mitsui court held the containers not to be
packages, it upheld the purposes Congress contemplated in en-
tion to amend the Hague Rules; Member, Braham & Simon, P.C. (Nov. 1981). But see
De Orchis, The Container and the Package Limitation - The Search for Predictability,
5 J. MAP. L. & COM. 251, 279 (1974) who suggests a different approach which would place
the burden on the shipper to either declare the container as the package or pay a higher
freight. See supra note 40.
96. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 270 (1976) (container is
substitute for hold of ship). See Simon, More on the Law of Shipping Containers, 6 J.
MA&. L. & ComL 603, 604 (1975) (the president of a consortium of steamship companies
characterized the container as part of the ship when he said that the ship is now able to
meet the shippers on shore).
97. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
98. It would appear manifestly unfair to penalize a shipper wililing to disclose perti-
nent information regarding his goods because the carrier refused to accept such informa-
tion on the bill of lading. Cf. Matsushita Electric Corp. v. S. S. Aegis Spirit, 414 F. Supp.
at 908 (carrier's argument that he was without knowledge of contents has no merit; his
situation is "largely of [his] own making" which could be easily rectified by him).
99. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976). The liability per container would be limited to $500
unless the nature and value of such goods were declared by the shipper, before shipment
and inserted into the bill of lading. See supra note 3.
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acting section 1304(5)."00 The court was faced with the difficult
task of statutory construction in the absence of subsequent leg-
islation. Congress enacted the package limitation in 1936 when
the average package was small010 and value did not generally ex-
ceed $500.102 Today, goods are shipped in containers and the
value of goods has increased sharply. Congress has, nevertheless,
failed to amend COGSA and thereby take into consideration
this new dimension in shipping and current economic realities.103
Statutory construction has consistently led to conflicting deci-
sions among the courts especially when technological develop-
ments alter the process which the legislation utilized to affectu-
ate its ends. Some guidance has been necessary:
The rules of statutory construction require that statutes should
be sensibly construed to give effect to the object or policy behind
the legislation; that general terms should be limited to only those
things contemplated by the legislature at the time of the enact-
ment; that courts should avoid the mischief which the statute was
enacted to rectify.' 0'
100. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 65-
67.
101. See generally Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MA. L. & Com.
507, 519 (1974) (packages had to be small because they were manually loaded onto the
ships).
102. Id. See 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976), supra note 3. If the packages individually
exceeded $500, in order to protect himself, the shipper would have to insert the nature
and value of such goods on the bill of lading before shipment. In this way, COGSA pro-
tects the carriers against excessive claims in respect of small packages of great value but
does not permit the carriers to escape liability for just claims.
103. The Hague Rules (which were the, model for COGSA) were amended in 1968
resulting in the increase of a carrier's liability from $500 to $662 per package or unit and
the addition of a provision dealing with shipments of goods in containers:
Where a container, a pallet or similar article of transport is used to consoli-
date goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the Bill of Lading as
packed in such article of transport shall be deemed the number of packages or
units for the purpose of this paragraph as far as these packages or units are con-
cerned. Except as aforesaid, such article of transport shall be considered the pack-
age or unit.
Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of
Law Relating to Bills of Lading, August 25, 1968, reprinted in The Hamburg Rules on
the Carriage of Goods by Sea 302 (S. Mankabady ed. 1978). The United States sent
delegates to the Convention yet Congress has not adopted the Protocol.
104. Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAx. & Com. 507, 527 (1974)
(citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1981). The Kulmerland deci-
sion did not effectuate section 1304(5)'s objective; it allowed the carrier to avoid liability
by holding the container to be a package. Id.
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"Package" is a general term which should be construed ac-
cording to the units contemplated by the legislators in 1936.105
Containers were not considered by the legislators at the time of
COGSA's enactment. The Second Circuit in Mitsui did not vio-
late these rules of statutory construction per se; it nevertheless,
did not go far enough to adequately protect the purposes of the
Act.
VI. Impact
By strictly following Leather's Best, °es Mitsui failed to con-
front the container problem when there is no disclosure of the
contents on the bill of lading.10 7 In overlooking industry prac-
tices of nondisclosure, the court has left shippers without the
assured protection COGSA was designed to afford because carri-
ers are still able to unfairly limit their liability. The practical
effect is that the carrier is absolutely exonerated from liability
because shippers will be reluctant to sustain high litigation costs
to recover a nominal recovery.
In the recent decision of Smythgreyhound v. M/V
Eurygenes, "08 the Second Circuit effectively overruled Kulmer-
land's functional economics test and reinforced the general dis-
closure rule of Mitsui.109 Eurygenes emphasized that Leather's
105. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 491 F.2d at 963.
"Since no specialized or technical meaning was ascribed to the word 'package,' we must
assume that Congress had none in mind and intended that this word be given its plain,
ordinary meaning." Id. But see Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S. S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152,
156 (2d Cir. 1968). "Package" has become a term of art in the marine industry. The
shipper should be held to the number of packages placed on the bill of lading whether it
be the number or containers or the number of smaller unite. Id., Mitsubishi Int'l Corp. v.
S. S. Palmetto State, 311 F.2d at 383. The definition of the word "package" should be
classified as a shipping term; the layman's conception of the word is insignificant. Id.
106. See generally Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MA. L. & Com.
507, 519 (1974). In 1936, barrels, sacks, cartons, and drums were among the units classi-
fied as packages. Id.
See Edelman, Cargo Claims Involving Containers, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 1981, at 2, col.
3. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying note 82, notes 95 and 98 and accompanying text.
108. 666 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981). Although Eurygenes was decided after Mitsui, the
district court decision was handed down prior to Mitsui. The district court applied the
$500 package limitation to the containers because the shipper had a choice of shipping
breakbulk or via containers; his choice of the latter method demonstrated an acquies-
cence in the package limitation being applied to the containers. Id. at 748.
109. Id. at 753.
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Best and Mitsui established a distinct rule which does not in-
volve a complex intent analysis which would involve the onerous
task of proving motive at the time of the contract negotiations
and finalization.210 The Eurygenes court further analyzed that
Mitsui did not place significance on the fact that the carrier in
Mitsui did not verify the contents of the containers as was the
case in Leather's Best."' Taking that analysis one step further
leads to the following question: if verification of the contents is
insignificant, why should the shipper be subject to a disclosure
requirement?
In Leather's Best, the contents were verified by the carrier's
agent thus obligating the carrier to issue a bill of lading showing
the number of packages "as furnished in writing by the ship-
per."'" 2 The intent of the parties, therefore, was evident. In Mit-
sui, the bill of lading did not show intent because the contents
were not verified. The carrier, therefore, was under no obligation
to issue a bill of lading with the shipper's disclosure.11 In each
case there was disclosure; the significance of disclosure in
Leather's Best, however, was that it evidenced the intent of the
parties. Disclosure in Mitsui had no such significance; therefore,
the court's reliance on Leather's Best to support its disclosure
rule was misplaced. Because of the insignificance of disclosure in
Mitsui, it was an appropriate occasion for the court to go beyond
the Leather's Best requirements and hold that a container
should never be a package. In refraining from doing so, Mitsui
offers a narrow holding with a diminished impact; only when the
facts of future cases are similar to Mitsui will the shipper be
assured of adequate package limitation protection.
Although the Mitsui court criticized Kulmerland's limiting
the carrier's liability to $500 per container when the value of the
goods was many thousands of dollars, the court failed to recog-
nize that this same inequitable result will occur whenever a ship-
per fails to disclose the contents of the container either through
inadvertence or because shipping practices so dictate."14 The
110. Id. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 751. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
112. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(3) (1976). See supra note 76.
113. Id. § 1303(3)(c). See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
114. See aupra note 95.
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threat of such an inequitable result thwarts the purposes of
COGSA, yet will persist until the courts establish that a
container is never a package.
Mitsui has established a predictable test based on owner-
ship and disclosure for the container/package problem that may
reduce litigation." 5 This gain in predictability is at the expense
of the more basic purpose of COGSA, to set a figure below which
a carrier cannot limit his liability. Although the Mitsui court
correctly held that the containers were not the packages, as pre-
cedent, it does not assure shippers that the containers will never
be COGSA packages. The Mitsui requirements, therefore, do
not guarantee that the primary purpose of COGSA will be
enforced.
VII. Recommendation
A container should never be a package regardless of the dis-
closure of the contents of the container or its ownership. Con-
tainers are standardized to meet the specifications of the con-
tainerships; as such, their function as a part of the ship should
not change with ownership or disclosure. Once it is concluded
that a container is not a package within the meaning of section
1304(5), the inquiry shifts to whether the contents of the
container are shipped in packages or whether a customary
freight unit should limit the carrier's liability.116 This determina-
tion is more difficult when containers carry the goods since the
container serves to decrease the amount of protection necessary
for transportation; thus the goods will not require as much pack-
aging had the container not been used. A corollary to this prob-
lem is that a court may be faced with complaints by carrier
groups that the shipper's representations are not legitimate and
that the carriers are being held liable for small packages of great
value. This, however, is not a novel complaint and has been re-
solved by placing the burden of proof of the contents of the con-
tainers on the shipper and also by limiting carriers' liability to
115. See supra notes 34 and 86. Many times the ownership of the container is not
discernible. In such cases, neither party will be assured of his burden of risk at the time
of contract.
116. See supra note 3 and text accompanying note 75.
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$500 per package or the value of the goods, whichever is less."",
It is this writer's recommendation that Congress enact sup-
plemental COGSA legislation to include a container limitation
which would measure the carrier's liability by either the value of
the goods or the container limitation, whichever is less. 18 Such a
limitation would serve the same basic purposes that the package
limitation served to establish in 1936. Whenever goods are
shipped via container, the carrier would be assured of its maxi-
mum liability by multiplying the amount set by Congress as the
container limitation by the number of containers.11 9 Such a limi-.
tation would obviate the risk that courts will set carriers' liabil-
ity at insubstantial amounts in cases where the container is held
to be a package. In addition, the container limitation would sim-
plify the complex bill of lading and provide a uniform, predict-
able and fair liability test for all those engaged in marine trans-
portation; thus reducing litigation.2 0 Although Mitsui insures
uniformity and predictability, it does not assure that carriers
will make shippers whole for the losses they incur because it
does not guarantee that the container will never be the $500
package.
The recommended container limitation provision would
supplement section 1304(5) by stating that when goods are
shipped in containers, the carrier's liability would not exceed a
stated amount per container. Such a provision would be consis-
tent with COGSA's statutory scheme thereby requiring no sub-
stantial changes.121
117. See infra note 118.
118. The package limitation limits the carrier's liability to $500 per package; if the
actual value of the cargo is less than $500 per package then the carrier's liability will be
limited to the fair market value of the goods. See supra notes 3 and 59.
119. To establish a carrier's maximum liability under § 1304(5) the number of pack-
ages is multipied by $500. See supra note 3.
120. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
121. Section 1304(5) would become the container/package limitation:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any
loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount
exceeding $500 per package lawful money of the United States or if goods are
shipped in containers XXX per container lawful money of the United States, or
in case of goods not shipped in packages or containers, per customary freight unit,
*.. unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper
before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976) (recommended legislation in italics).
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VIII. Conclusion
The Mitsui court correctly decided not to follow Kulmer-
land on the ground that the functional economics test was in-
consistent with Leather's Best and it defeated the benefits of
containerization. Mitsui unnecessarily limited its holding, how-
ever, by narrowly adhering to the principles announced in
Leather's Best. 1 2 The Second Circuit showed a clear under-
standing of the purposes of COGSA and the evil sought to be
remedied by that Act. Nonetheless, the court did not consider
section 1303(3) of COGSA which renders disclosure of the num-
ber of units within the container irrelevant when such disclosure
cannot be verified. 128 The court did not seize the opportunity to
distinguish Leather's Best on the basis of the disclosure require-
ment and thus failed to announce a comprehensive rule consis-
tent with the purposes of COGSA.
The Mitsui decision indicates a desire by the court to ad-
here to factors previously considered important in determining
what is a package.' 2' This is illustrated by the Mitsui require-
ments of disclosure of carrier-owned or carrier-furnished con-
tainers even when the court recognized that the container is a
part of the ship.12 5 The container is one or the other. If it is a
part of the ship, the Mitsui requirements are meaningless be-
cause the container is not the package notwithstanding disclo-
sure or ownership. The container does not cease being a part of
the ship when a shipper fails to disclose information which the
carrier is not bound to rely on or include on the bill of lading.
In 1936 Congress was concerned with precluding carriers
from limiting liability to insubstantial amounts. Finding a
container to be a package within the meaning of section 1304(5)
serves to defeat this purpose by exonerating the carrier from lia-
bility. 2 6 If a container is considered to be a package, a shipper
122. See supra notes 85-87, 106-113 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. See also Simon, Latest Devel-
opments in the Law of Shipping Containers, 4 J. MAP. LAw & Com. 441, 442 (1972).
Notwithstanding the clear liability of the carrier, if goods are placed into a single
container and the cost of litigation exceeds $500, the practical effect would be no liability
for the carrier. Id.
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may decide not to litigate after balancing the costs of litigation
with the prospects of a favorable judgment.12 7 There is concern,
therefore, not only with insubstantial liability, but also with no
liability.
According to section 1304(5), disclosure of the nature and
value of the goods within a container is necessary only when the
value of the units within the container individually exceed
$500.128 If Congress intended to make such disclosure instru-
mental in defining the package it would have so indicated.
Although the Mitsui court correctly held that the containers
involved were not section 1304(5) packages, its reasoning is lim-
ited as an equitable standard because it does not give sufficient
protection to shippers.12 9 Rules of statutory construction guide
the courts and state that "the court should avoid the mischief
which the statute was enacted to rectify."130 Mitsui recognized
the primary purpose of section 1304(5) and presented this very
argument in support of its decision not to follow Kulmerland.3 1
It nevertheless limited its holding to situations where there is
disclosure of carrier-owned or carrier-furnished containers.
These requirements do not further the purposes of section
1304(5)132 and do not reflect marine industry practices.133
Mary Elizabeth Reisert
127. Id.
128. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 72-76, 114 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 95.
[Vol. 2:309
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/6
